Eurobond underwriter spreads by Esho, Neil et al.
EUROBOND UNDERWRITER SPREADS+ 
 
 
Neil Esho* 
Michael G Kollo** 
and 
Ian G. Sharpe*** 
 
January 2004 
 
JEL Codes: G24, G15. 
Keywords: Underwriter spread, Eurobonds, Governing law. 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
We examine the determinants of underwriter spreads on straight/fixed rate Eurobonds 
issued by U.S. firms between 1990 and 1998. We find that underwriter spreads are 
influenced by: (i) the governing law as it influences the timely and orderly renegotiation 
of contract terms, with bonds governed by English law having significantly lower 
spreads; (ii) the distribution mechanism, with spreads higher on public issues than private 
placements; (iii) underwriter reputation, with more reputable underwriters charging 
higher fees; and (iv) the choice of currency, with spreads higher in the less frequently 
utilized currencies and/or in currencies where underwriting activities are more 
concentrated. 
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EUROBOND UNDERWRITER SPREADS  
 
The last decade has witnessed enormous growth in both volume and sophistication 
of the international financial markets, and particularly the Eurobond market. This growth 
has been facilitated by several factors including increasing globalisation, restrictive legal 
environments within domestic markets, illiquid domestic markets, high barriers of entry 
into domestic markets, and favourable financing opportunities (Giddy (1995, p. 129) and 
Kim and Stulz (1988)). 
Despite the importance of the Eurobond market as an alternative source of funds for 
U.S. firms, and the role of underwriter spreads in the cost of those funds, there has been no 
prior study of the determinants of underwriter fees in that market. This is somewhat 
surprising as there is an extensive literature dealing with underwriter spreads in U.S. debt 
and equity markets. It has focused on clustering in IPO underwriter spreads at the 7% level, 
the effects of certification and signaling of the quality of the issue by more reputable 
underwriters, the benefits of an ongoing underwriter/issuer relationship, the presence of 
risk based investor clienteles, scale economies in underwriter spreads, and the effect of 
Rule 144A issues.1  
The primary objective of our study is to extend the U.S. domestic debt and equity 
market literature on underwriter spreads to incorporate two factors that are unique to the 
international debt markets, the choice of governing law and currency of denomination. 
Eurobonds carry a choice of law clause that subjects the payment obligations of the 
borrower to one governing system of law. This provides a guide to the validity, 
enforceability, and interpretation of the contractual and other legal aspects of the Eurobond. 
In practice, the applicable legal systems most often used are the English and New York 
                                                 
1 See Megginson and Weiss (1991), Roden and Bassler (1996), Altõnkõlõç and Hansen (2000), Jewell and 
Livingston (1998), Jain and Kini (1999), Livingston and Miller (2000), Chen and Ritter (2000), Hansen 
(2001), Roden and Mullineaux (2002)), and Livingston and Zhou (2002). 
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laws. While these legal systems have many similarities, there are important differences that 
affect the ability to renegotiate contract terms in the event of default. Wood (1995, p. 179-
180) notes that New York law is more stringent in its protection of individual bondholders 
rights and less amenable to private workouts. Consequently, a contract under English 
governing law may be viewed as having lower renegotiation risk than one under New York 
law. As the choice of governing law influences the risk of the investment, the potential 
investor base for the issue, and the marketing effort required by the underwriter, it is 
expected to influence the underwriter spread on the issue. 
The currency of denomination is an important element of the Eurobond contract 
that sets it apart from domestic bonds. While Eurobonds may be denominated in any 
currency of choice, issuers have access to cross-currency swaps to mitigate foreign 
exchange exposure.2 Investors in Eurobonds denominated in currencies other than their 
home nation will either incur the costs of cross-currency hedging or be exposed to foreign 
exchange risk. When investors face higher risks in investing in an issue, underwriters may 
incur higher distribution costs and charge higher fees. Moreover, in some countries 
institutional investors are limited in their ability to invest in securities denominated in a 
foreign currency, enhancing the possibility of currency based investor clienteles (see Lanoo 
(1998, p. 318)). Thus an important aspect of this study is an examination of the effect of the 
choice of currency denomination on Eurobond underwriter spreads. 
A secondary objective of our study is to examine whether several results relating to 
the determinants of underwriter spreads in U.S. debt and equity markets are also observed 
in the Eurobond market. The Eurobond market is less regulated than the U.S. domestic 
bond market while the market for Eurobond underwriting services is less concentrated than 
underwriting in the domestic bond market (see Smith and Walter (1997, pp 248-249 & 270-
                                                 
2 Shapiro (1999, p.534) notes that it is estimated that 70% of Eurobond issues are swap driven. 
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272)). Moreover, some countries have protected their domestic investment banking 
industry by imposing significant entry costs on foreign underwriting firms that may be 
reflected in higher underwriter fees (see Fisher (1988)). 
Among the regulatory differences between the U.S. bond market and the Eurobond 
market are those relating to the method of distributing the bonds. Livingston and Zhou 
(2002) argue that Rule 144A private placements in the U.S. have offsetting influences on 
underwriter spreads. On the one hand, Rule 144A issues have less onerous disclosure 
requirements and are generally associated with greater information asymmetries (Carey et 
al (1993, p. 33)). This results in greater risk for investors and higher distribution costs for 
underwriters. On the other hand, private placements are generally sold to a small number of 
institutional investors and avoid the road show costs associated with public issues. 
Consequently, they involve lower marketing and distribution costs for the underwriter. 
Although the Rule 144A exemption is of less relevance for Eurobond issues, private 
placements of Eurobonds generally involve less disclosure than public issues which are 
usually listed and thus subject to disclosure rules of the relevant Exchanges. However, the 
information asymmetry normally associated with issuers of private placements in the U.S. 
domestic market is likely to be of lesser concern in Eurobond markets given the high credit 
quality and reputation of Eurobond issuers. Thus the choice between a private placement 
and public issue of Eurobonds is likely to be driven more by relative costs of the alternative 
distribution mechanisms than information asymmetries. 
Finally, a study of underwriter spreads in the Eurobond market allows us to 
reexamine the role of underwriter reputation in setting spreads. Chemmanur and Fulghieri 
(1994) model the value of reputation to underwriters of initial public offers based on a 
dynamic trade-off between setting strict standards in evaluating firms that increases 
underwriter reputation, and setting lower standards that produce greater short-term revenue 
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